HYDRA · network anomaly detection

Learns how your network normally behaves, and shows what deviates.

HYDRA reads a passive copy of network traffic, learns the normal behaviour of that specific network from its own unlabelled traffic, and flags behaviour that deviates from it, with the context an analyst needs to investigate. It is designed to complement signature-based defences, not to replace them.

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Where HYDRA stands
Maturitydemonstrated on our own lab cyber range
Research prototype
Customer deploymentwork starts as a scoped technical assessment
None yet
Deliverydesigned for on-premises use, without cloud connectivity

Designed for customer-controlled processing, with deployment options agreed for each implementation.

01
The problem

A new way of moving data may match no written rule.

  • Intrusion detection systems and signatures recognise patterns that someone has already described. A new way of moving data or acting on files can match no rule, and still stand out against what is normal on that particular network.
  • Analysts need more than a score: which host behaved how, and compared with what.
  • Context: IBM reports a global mean breach lifecycle of 241 days in 2025, from identification to containment and service restoration (IBM, Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025). This is an industry figure, not a HYDRA result.
02
How it works

From a copy of traffic to an alert an analyst can inspect.

01 · OBSERVEPassive copy

Reads a mirror port or network TAP. Sends no packets and does not block traffic.

02 · DESCRIBEBehaviour

Name resolution, connections, timing, filesharing activity. For encrypted traffic, metadata, not content.

03 · COMPARELearned normal

Models learn this network’s normal behaviour from unlabelled traffic. Rule-based checks cover known patterns.

04 · EXPLAINAlert with context

Which host, what behaviour, how it differs from the baseline, tied to the underlying network record.

Intrusion detection and signatures

HYDRA complements them. Known, high-confidence patterns remain well served by rules.

SIEM

An integration destination, not something to replace. SIEM export is planned.

SOC and analysts

Decision support and faster triage. HYDRA is passive: your team decides what happens next.

03
What sets it apart

Local, lightweight, and built to be examined.

Your network, your baseline

The models learn from the organisation’s own traffic; no labelled attack data is needed to start.

Careful with “normal”

We do not assume that existing traffic is clean. Training data is selected and checked against independent sources to reduce the risk of learning malicious activity as normal.

Local and lightweight

Runs on premises without cloud connectivity, designed for isolated networks too. Small models run on standard CPUs; sizing is measured in each environment.

Inspectable by design

The learned models are built on Kolmogorov–Arnold Networks, whose learned functions can be plotted and examined. This is the basis for the analyst-facing explanations we are developing.

The model stays with you

The trained model remains in your environment and can be handed over to your team on request.

Disciplined measurement

We report results with their denominators and keep negative results, so a successful demo is not presented as general performance.

04
Lab demonstrations

Two scenarios on our own cyber range.

Our lab cyber range has 15 virtual machines running Windows and Linux clients, a file server and common services, with everyday background traffic as the baseline.

Lab demonstration

Data hidden in DNS queries

A client sends a file in small pieces hidden in name-resolution requests, while normal name resolution continues. Shown in the lab.

Demonstrated in lab · detection validation ongoing

Mass encryption on a file server

A client encrypts files on a shared drive over SMB. Scenario demonstrated in the lab; detection validation ongoing.

These are lab demonstrations on our own infrastructure, not results from a customer network. HYDRA does not claim to detect every attack.

05
Readiness

Readiness and integration requirements.

Network anomaly detectionpassive monitoring, learned baseline, rule-based checks
Research prototype
DNS exfiltration scenarioon our lab cyber range
Lab demonstration
SMB file-encryption scenarioon our lab cyber range
Demonstrated in lab · detection validation ongoing
Customer deploymentstarts as an assessment
None yet
SIEM export
Planned
The same approach for operational anomalies (AIOps)
Concept

Requirements: a mirror port or TAP on the segments to be observed, a server inside your environment, and a period of representative everyday traffic to learn from.

06
Where it is relevant

Where it is relevant.

  • Mid-sized organisations with limited SOC capacity; managed security service providers looking for an additional behavioural signal.
  • Critical infrastructure and industrial environments where network visibility matters; financial services and the public sector.
  • University and research networks.
  • Typical conversation partners: CISOs, SOC leads, heads of network and infrastructure.

The first joint assessment.

  • A conversation about your environment and the question you want answered.
  • Clarifying which network segments and traffic sources can be observed, and under what data-handling conditions.
  • A scoped technical assessment: HYDRA learns a baseline from your traffic and runs in shadow mode; we review its alerts with your analysts and deliver a written report.
  • We agree the scope, terms and any fees of an assessment before it starts.

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